Koger Kidd v. City of Wilmington

Summary

The Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal with prejudice of Quintin Koger Kidd's consolidated public-records-access complaints against the City of Wilmington. The court held that R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) grants the Court of Claims broad discretion to dismiss such complaints upon a special master's recommendation, including based on abusive patterns of public-records requests and enforcement actions. The court also upheld the striking of Kidd's objections, consolidation of the complaints, and restriction of access to unredacted attorney-fee invoices protected by attorney-client privilege.

Holdings

1. A dismissal under R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) is not governed by the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure-to-state-a-claim standard. The statute gives the Court of Claims broader authority to dismiss a public-records-access complaint at any time upon a special master's recommendation.
2. R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) places no substantive or procedural limitations on the Court of Claims' authority to dismiss a complaint upon a special master's recommendation. The court may rely on the principles identified in Schaffer, including the number, frequency, and duplicative nature of public-records requests and enforcement actions, and need not adjudicate the complaint's merits before dismissal.
3. R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) does not provide a right to object to a special master's recommendation for dismissal, and striking Kidd's objections did not violate due process.
4. The special master did not abuse his discretion by consolidating Kidd's seven complaints for purposes of determining whether his conduct supported dismissal.
5. The Court of Claims properly struck the unredacted attorney-fee invoices and restricted public access to the filings containing them because the narrative portions were protected by attorney-client privilege and the court satisfied Sup.R. 45(E).

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Court of Claims could dismiss public-records-access complaints under R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) without applying the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard.
2. Whether R.C. 2743.75 required the Court of Claims to adjudicate each complaint on its merits rather than dismissing them based on abuse of the public-records laws.
3. Whether the dismissal was an abuse of discretion because it relied on the number, frequency, and duplicative nature of the requests and enforcement actions without applying the vexatious-litigator procedures in R.C. 2323.52.
4. Whether Kidd was entitled to object to a special master's recommendation for dismissal under R.C. 2743.75(D)(2) and whether the procedure violated due process.
5. Whether consolidation of the seven complaints under Civ.R. 42 was proper.
6. Whether the Court of Claims properly struck unredacted attorney-fee invoices and restricted public access to filings containing them.

Disposition

affirmed