State v. Bodyke

Summary

The Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, provisions of Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act requiring executive reclassification of sex offenders previously classified by court order, violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court concluded that only appellate courts may review or modify judicial judgments and that the executive branch could not reopen final classifications. It severed the challenged provisions, invalidated the attorney general’s reclassifications, and reinstated the offenders’ prior judicial classifications.

Holdings

1. R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because they instruct the executive branch to review and modify prior judicial classifications of sex offenders.
2. R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by requiring the opening of final judicial judgments imposing sex-offender classifications and registration or notification requirements.
3. R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 are severed from the Adam Walsh Act and may not be enforced against offenders previously adjudicated under Megan's Law.
4. The court held that prior decisions upholding Megan's Law and its amendments did not compel the same result because the AWA and the facts presented were materially different; it further stated that stare decisis is not controlling in constitutional cases.

Questions Presented

1. Whether R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by authorizing the executive branch to reclassify sex offenders previously classified by courts.
2. Whether those provisions impermissibly require the reopening or modification of final judicial judgments.
3. Whether the reclassification provisions should be severed from the remainder of the Adam Walsh Act.
4. Whether stare decisis required adherence to prior decisions upholding Megan's Law and its amendments.

Disposition

reversed