Kleng v. Reyes

Summary

The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Brett George Kleng’s petition for post-conviction relief. The court rejected claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, including failure to move for judgment of acquittal or suppress evidence, vouching, closing argument, jury unanimity and polling, an involuntary Alford plea, and cumulative error. The court held that the challenged decisions were either supported by the record and reasonable trial strategy or did not establish prejudice.

Holdings

1. A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to file a particular motion must show that counsel unreasonably assessed the motion's strategic value or failed to understand or recognize supporting existing law, and must establish that the motion would have succeeded and affected the outcome. Kleng failed to show a reasonable likelihood that a judgment-of-acquittal motion would have been granted because the trial evidence permitted a factfinder to find forcible compulsion.
2. Counsel's informed strategic decision not to seek suppression of the entire police interview did not constitute inadequate or ineffective assistance.
3. Counsel was not ineffective for allowing statements concerning the victim's truthfulness and police officers' statements to remain in evidence when the decisions reflected an objectively reasonable trial strategy.
4. The prosecutor did not improperly comment on Kleng's decision not to testify, and the challenged other-acts argument was permissible because it was offered for a non-propensity purpose rather than to establish character.
5. The post-conviction court correctly denied relief on Kleng's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a unanimity instruction and jury poll.
6. The post-conviction court correctly denied relief on the claim that counsel failed to ensure that Kleng's Alford plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
7. Cumulative error is not an independent ground for post-conviction relief.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate and ineffective assistance by failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on the forcible-compulsion element of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and first-degree sexual abuse.
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Kleng's police interview.
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to alleged vouching testimony concerning the victim's truthfulness and statements by police officers.
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing argument.
5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a unanimity instruction and jury poll.
6. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that Kleng's Alford plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
7. Whether cumulative trial errors independently warranted post-conviction relief.
8. Whether the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on any of Kleng's eight assignments of error.

Disposition

affirmed