State v. Clegg, 332 Or. 432

Summary

The Oregon Supreme Court held that testimony recounting the victim's statement about her plans and a recent telephone conversation was admissible under Oregon Evidence Code 803(3) as state-of-mind evidence. The court also concluded that, because the defendant did not request a limiting instruction, the testimony could be used to infer his participation in the murder-for-hire scheme. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the circuit court judgment.

Holdings

1. The statements made by Christina to defendant during their telephone conversation were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of their contents. Christina's statement to Hughes recounting that conversation was hearsay because it was offered to prove that defendant called Christina and attempted to persuade her to remain at the office.
2. Christina's statement was admissible under OEC 803(3) because it asserted or reflected her then-existing intent or plan to go to the bank with Gladys.
3. The statement was relevant because evidence that Christina planned to leave the office before lunch, considered with evidence that defendant immediately sought to change that plan, tended to make it more probable that defendant participated in a plan requiring her presence at the office when the gunmen arrived.
4. Because defendant did not request a limiting instruction, the prosecution could use Hughes's testimony for any purpose supported by its rational persuasive force, including proving defendant's participation in the murder-for-hire plan.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Christina Clegg's out-of-court statement to Kendra Hughes recounting her telephone conversation with defendant was hearsay.
2. Whether Christina's statement was admissible under Oregon Evidence Code 803(3) as a statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind or intent.
3. Whether the statement was relevant to prove defendant's participation in the murder-for-hire scheme.
4. Whether, absent a limiting-instruction request, the prosecution could use the admitted testimony for its rationally persuasive value in proving defendant's participation in the murder.

Disposition

affirmed