State v. Agee

Summary

The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed Isacc Creed Agee’s aggravated-murder conviction but vacated his death sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trial court improperly permitted extensive pretrial questioning of a key defense witness, although that error was harmless, and identified additional reversible errors concerning intellectual-disability eligibility and penalty-phase evidence. The case arose from the killing of an inmate at the Oregon State Penitentiary.

Holdings

1. The trial court exceeded its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to question Davenport extensively about the events of the murder, effectively conducting an unlawful pretrial deposition of a defense witness; however, the error was harmless.
2. The trial court applied an inappropriate standard in determining that defendant had not proved intellectual disability and therefore was eligible for execution. A new Atkins hearing was required under current medical standards reflected in the DSM-5 and Hall v. Florida.
3. The trial court erred by excluding defense experts' testimony that they had diagnosed defendant as intellectually disabled, and the error was not harmless.
4. Neither the Sixth nor the Eighth Amendment requires the trial court to instruct the jury that it must determine whether defendant is intellectually disabled.
5. Evidence that Davenport received a life sentence for his role in the murder was relevant mitigating evidence under ORS 163.150 and should have been admitted during the penalty phase.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court improperly permitted the prosecutor to conduct an extensive pretrial examination of codefendant Davenport concerning the murder outside the jury's presence.
2. Whether the trial court applied an improper standard in determining that defendant had failed to prove intellectual disability and consequent ineligibility for the death penalty.
3. Whether the penalty-phase court improperly excluded expert testimony that defendant had been diagnosed as intellectually disabled.
4. Whether the Sixth or Eighth Amendment required the jury to determine whether defendant was intellectually disabled.
5. Whether the penalty-phase court improperly excluded evidence that codefendant Davenport received a life sentence for his role in the murder.

Disposition

vacated