State v. Taylor, 364 Or. 364

Summary

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the convictions and death sentence of a defendant convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, bank robbery, and related offenses. The court addressed joinder of offenses, substantial prejudice from a joint trial, death qualification of the jury, and the need for jury concurrence on robbery theories, affirming the judgment.

Holdings

1. An indictment may sufficiently allege the basis for joining offenses under ORS 132.560(1)(b) by alleging facts and cross-referencing counts that establish the statutory basis; it need not recite the statute's exact language.
2. The indictment properly joined the offenses because the two bank robberies were of the same or similar character, the Gutierrez offenses were part of a common scheme or plan to commit the Mapleton robbery, and the firearm-possession counts were connected to the robberies.
3. The trial court did not err in denying severance because defendant offered only a general concern about the prejudicial effect of other-acts evidence and did not demonstrate substantial prejudice tied to the particular facts of the case.
4. The Constitution does not prohibit death-qualifying juries in capital cases, and the court declined to reconsider its precedent approving the practice.
5. The court did not decide whether defendant was entitled to a concurrence instruction on the robbery theories because, on this record, the instructional error, if any, presented little likelihood of affecting the verdict and therefore was not a basis for reversal.
6. Oregon's use of a jury question concerning whether the defendant would probably commit future violent criminal acts does not punish status or mere propensity in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
7. The Governor's moratorium did not make the jury's death-penalty determination unconstitutional because the trial court instructed the jury to assume that a death sentence imposed while the moratorium was in effect would ultimately be carried out.
8. An undisclosed bias by an alternate juror does not require a new trial or support a presumption that the deliberating jury was tainted when the alternate did not participate in deliberations and there is no evidence that the alternate communicated the bias or extrajudicial information to deliberating jurors.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the indictment properly joined offenses arising from the two bank robberies, the Gutierrez kidnapping and murder, and firearm possession under ORS 132.560(1)(b).
2. Whether the indictment had to expressly use the statutory terms describing the basis for joinder or could allege the basis through facts and cross-references.
3. Whether the trial court erred by denying severance based on substantial prejudice from the joint trial.
4. Whether the Constitution prohibited death-qualifying the jury.
5. Whether defendant was entitled to a concurrence instruction requiring jurors to agree on the theory of robbery liability.
6. Whether Oregon's death-penalty statute unconstitutionally imposed punishment based on propensity or future dangerousness.
7. Whether the Governor's moratorium on executions prevented the jury from constitutionally considering or imposing a death sentence.
8. Whether an alternate juror's undisclosed bias required a new trial or a presumption that the deliberating jurors were tainted.

Disposition

affirmed