Commonwealth v. Schneider, 386 Pa. Super. 202

Summary

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Mervin D. Schneider’s judgment of sentence for aggravated assault arising from injuries to a nine-month-old child. The court held that Schneider’s incriminating statements made after a voluntary polygraph examination were not involuntary, distinguishing cases involving misleading representations about the use of polygraph results. The court also held that several claims were waived and upheld medical expert testimony regarding the child’s injuries.

Holdings

1. A confession is not involuntary merely because it is made in anticipation of, during, or following a polygraph examination. Schneider's statements were voluntary because he was told the examination was voluntary, was advised of his rights, was told that the results could not be used against him in court, and was not misled into believing that the results would be shown to the court or used to punish him.
2. The Miranda issue was waived because Schneider did not raise it before trial or at trial. In any event, the record supported the trial court's conclusion that he was properly advised of his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them.
3. Schneider waived his claim that the trial court prevented him from presenting testimony that the polygraph examination coerced his confession because he did not make a timely and specific objection, offer of proof, or request for relief at trial.
4. Treating physicians may give medical opinions based in part on reports or diagnostic materials that are not independently admitted into evidence when such materials are customarily relied upon by medical professionals in the practice of their profession. The physicians were also sufficiently qualified to describe their personal knowledge of the x-rays in this case.

Questions Presented

1. Whether incriminating statements made after Schneider was confronted with the results of a polygraph examination were voluntary.
2. Whether the police adequately advised Schneider of his Miranda rights before he made the statements.
3. Whether Schneider preserved his claim that the trial court improperly prevented him from testifying that the polygraph examination coerced his confession.
4. Whether treating physicians were competent to diagnose the child's injuries when their opinions relied in part on x-rays and CT scans interpreted by others and not introduced into evidence.

Disposition

affirmed