Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363

Summary

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed Roger Peter Buehl’s automatic direct appeal from three first-degree murder convictions and three death sentences arising from the killings of Courtland and Alexandra Gross and Catherine VanderVeur. The court rejected challenges concerning venue, jury selection, ineffective assistance of counsel, evidentiary matters, and sentencing instructions, and affirmed the convictions and death sentences.

Holdings

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue without a pretrial hearing because voir dire showed no actual prejudice and the publicity was not shown to be inherently prejudicial.
2. Buehl failed to establish ineffective assistance because the challenged actions either lacked arguable merit, had a reasonable strategic basis, or caused no demonstrated prejudice.
3. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the death-qualified jury because exclusion of jurors whose views would prevent or substantially impair performance of their duties is constitutionally permissible.
4. The challenged identifications were admissible because, under the totality of the circumstances, the witnesses had sufficient opportunities to observe Buehl and the in-court identification had an independent reliable origin.
5. Evidence of the Pine Street and Kirkpatrick robberies was admissible because it tended to establish a common scheme, plan, or design, identity, motive, and modus operandi connecting the crimes.
6. The demurrers to false imprisonment, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person, and unlawful restraint were properly denied because the prosecution's evidence and reasonable inferences could support findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
7. The evidence was insufficient to support the finding that Catherine VanderVeur was killed by means of torture, but the invalidation of that aggravating circumstance did not require vacating the death sentence because another aggravating circumstance was sufficient and no mitigating circumstances were found.
8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged photographs because they were relevant and were not clearly inflammatory; even if inflammatory, their probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice.
9. The alleged post-trial alibi evidence did not warrant a new trial because it could have been discovered and presented before or during trial through reasonable diligence and did not satisfy the remaining requirements for newly discovered evidence.
10. The death sentences were not excessive or disproportionate, were supported by an aggravating circumstance, and were not imposed as the product of passion, prejudice, or another arbitrary factor.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a change-of-venue motion without a pretrial hearing despite publicity surrounding the murders.
2. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective through an alleged conflict of interest, failure to challenge death-qualified jurors, failure to present diminished-capacity and mitigating evidence, failure to request jury instructions, inadequate cross-examination, and failure to object to an age instruction.
3. Whether challenged pretrial and in-court identifications were impermissibly suggestive or lacked an independent reliable basis.
4. Whether evidence of other robberies and crimes was admissible to establish common scheme, plan, identity, and modus operandi.
5. Whether the trial court improperly limited cross-examination, denied discovery of witness statements, excluded expert testimony, or refused demurrers.
6. Whether the evidence supported the torture aggravating circumstance for the killing of Catherine VanderVeur.
7. Whether photographs of the victims were improperly inflammatory.
8. Whether newly discovered alibi evidence warranted a new trial.
9. Whether the death sentences were excessive or disproportionate, unsupported by aggravating circumstances, or the product of passion, prejudice, or another arbitrary factor.

Disposition

affirmed