Commonwealth v. Rice

Summary

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed Timothy Rice's direct appeal from death sentences imposed after his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses. The court rejected challenges concerning sufficiency and weight of the evidence, guilt-phase counsel effectiveness, admissibility of penalty-phase evidence, prior violent-felony convictions, victim-impact evidence, and mitigating-factor jury instructions. The court affirmed the judgment of sentence.

Holdings

1. Evidence that Rice fired a .357 revolver at people in a crowded bar, shot unarmed victims in the back, admitted firing until the gun was empty, and was linked ballistically to the shooting was sufficient to establish specific intent to kill and support both first-degree murder convictions.
2. The murder verdicts were not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice, and the appellate court could not substitute its credibility and evidentiary judgments for those of the fact-finder.
3. Guilt-phase counsel was not ineffective because counsel actually argued the alleged inconsistencies concerning events outside the bar, the shooter's appearance, and gunpowder residue.
4. The trial court acted within its discretion in excluding Rice's prior testimony as proof of drug or alcohol impairment because it was not relevantly established and the Commonwealth had not been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine him on impairment; the court also could limit background evidence to relevant and indisputable material.
5. Rice's prior convictions for robbery and conspiracy to commit an armed robbery were admissible as violent felony convictions; section 9711(d)(9) does not require prior felonies to be factually similar to the current murders.
6. The victim-impact provisions in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) and (c)(2) were constitutionally valid, and Rice was not entitled to relief on his constitutional challenge.
7. The trial court's instruction was legally inaccurate because it limited consideration of victim-impact evidence to cases involving the catch-all mitigating circumstance and restricted its use to determining the weight of that circumstance. Nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not require a new sentencing hearing.
8. The trial court properly refused to instruct on extreme mental or emotional disturbance because Rice presented no evidence that he was suffering from that condition at the time of the murders.
9. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the Commonwealth could rebut evidence of Rice's good character with evidence of prison misconduct, and Rice was not entitled to relief after choosing not to present the character evidence.
10. The prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by cross-examining a defense witness about Rice's public assistance and support of his drug habit or by making the challenged closing remarks; the comment concerning remorse was stricken and could not have prejudiced Rice.
11. Penalty-phase counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination or request a life-without-parole instruction because the underlying claims lacked merit and the prosecution did not inject future dangerousness into the case.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support two convictions for first-degree murder, including specific intent to kill and deliberation.
2. Whether the murder verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.
3. Whether guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to argue alleged inconsistencies in the evidence.
4. Whether the trial court improperly excluded or limited Rice's guilt-phase testimony as penalty-phase mitigating or background evidence.
5. Whether prior robbery and conspiracy convictions were admissible as violent felony convictions in the penalty phase.
6. Whether Pennsylvania's victim-impact statute was constitutional and whether the jury instruction concerning victim-impact evidence required a new sentencing hearing.
7. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on extreme mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating circumstance.
8. Whether the trial court improperly limited mitigating evidence and permitted rebuttal evidence concerning Rice's character.
9. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-examination and closing argument.
10. Whether penalty-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial conduct or request a life-without-parole instruction.
11. Whether the death sentences were supported by the evidence and were not the product of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.

Disposition

affirmed