Scott v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing; Liero v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing; Neenan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing

Summary

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed one-year driver’s license suspensions imposed on three Pennsylvania licensees following their New Jersey convictions under N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a). The Court held that the New Jersey conviction reports, describing the offenses as operating under the influence of liquor or drugs, established conduct substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Driver’s License Compact. The electronically transmitted conviction reports constituted prima facie proof of the reported facts and supported PennDOT’s suspensions.

Holdings

1. The Compact requires comparison of the conduct proscribed by the out-of-state provision with Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact, not a direct comparison between the Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes.
2. The first two operating provisions of N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a)—operating under the influence and operating with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 percent or greater—are substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact.
3. A certified electronically transmitted New Jersey conviction report describing an offense as "operate under influence liq/drugs" constitutes prima facie evidence that the licensee was convicted of an operating offense under N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a), sufficient to support a one-year suspension absent contrary evidence.

Questions Presented

1. Whether PennDOT met its burden of proving that the appellants' New Jersey DWI convictions were based on conduct substantially similar to conduct covered by Article IV(a)(2) of the Driver's License Compact.
2. Whether a New Jersey conviction report identifying N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a) and describing the offense as operating under the influence of liquor or drugs constitutes sufficient prima facie evidence that the conviction involved an operating offense rather than a permitting offense.
3. Whether the operating-under-the-influence and per se operating provisions of N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a) are substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact.

Disposition

affirmed