Commonwealth v. Dellisanti, 583 Pa. 106

876 A.2d 366 (2005) · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 21, 2005

Summary

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court and reinstated Margaret Dellisanti’s convictions under the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act. The court held that the Act’s plain language encompassed her repeated sales of drug paraphernalia through her retail business and that the 1996 statutory amendments superseded prior limitations recognized in Commonwealth v. Bobitski. A dissent argued that applying the Act absent evidence of organized crime conflicted with its legislative purpose.

Holdings

  1. The Corrupt Organizations Act applies because Dellisanti engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity through an enterprise with which she was associated. Repeated sales of drug paraphernalia satisfied the statute's racketeering-pattern requirement, her retail store qualified as an enterprise, and her ownership satisfied the association requirement.
  2. The Act's express definitions and operative provisions do not require proof of traditional organized crime, force, fraud, corruption, violence, intimidation, or a separate organized-crime nexus when the statutory elements are otherwise satisfied.
  3. The 1996 amendments supplied a new definition of organized crime and expanded the definition of enterprise, bringing conduct such as Dellisanti's within the current statutory boundaries and displacing the contrary limitations recognized in Bobitski.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act applies to a business owner who conducts a legitimate retail business through repeated sales of drug paraphernalia, even absent evidence of traditional organized crime, force, fraud, corruption, violence, intimidation, or a connection to an organized-crime organization.
  2. Whether the 1996 amendments to the Corrupt Organizations Act altered the effect of Commonwealth v. Bobitski by defining organized crime and enterprise broadly enough to encompass Dellisanti's conduct.
  3. Whether the Superior Court properly relied on the perceived purpose and legislative findings of the Act rather than the Act's express definitions and operative provisions.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (8)

  • Commonwealth v. Dellisanti, 831 A.2d 1159, 1171-1172, 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)(reversed)
  • City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Williams), 578 Pa. 207, 851 A.2d 838, 844 (2004)(followed)
  • Department of Transportation v. Taylor, 576 Pa. 622, 841 A.2d 108, 112 (2004)(followed)
  • Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 n.3, 105 S. Ct. 479, 83 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1984)(followed)
  • Commonwealth v. Bobitski, 534 Pa. 310, 632 A.2d 1294, 1296-1297 (1993)(limited)
  • Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co., 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199, 202 (1963)(followed)
  • Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), appeal denied, 558 Pa. 607, 736 A.2d 603 (1999)(analogized)
  • Commonwealth v. Besch, 544 Pa. 1, 674 A.2d 655, 659-661 (1996)(limited)

Cited In (0)

No citing cases on record yet.

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