Commonwealth v. Hackett

Summary

This is a dissenting opinion by Justice Baer in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review of Richard Hackett’s Atkins claim. The dissent argues that the PCRA court properly found, based on expert testimony and other evidence, that Hackett had intellectual disability and was therefore ineligible for the death penalty. It contends that the majority improperly reweighed evidence and disregarded the deferential standard of appellate review applicable to factual and credibility findings.

Holdings

1. The PCRA court's determination that a petitioner is intellectually disabled is a mixed question of law and fact. Appellate review must defer to factual and credibility findings supported by substantial evidence and may not reweigh conflicting evidence merely because the record could support a contrary result.
2. The dissent would hold that the PCRA court properly found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hackett demonstrated limited intellectual functioning, significant adaptive limitations, and onset before age eighteen, making him ineligible for the death penalty.
3. A formal diagnosis of intellectual disability before age eighteen is not required under Miller; evidence of diminished intellectual functioning and onset before eighteen may suffice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the PCRA court's finding that Hackett satisfied Pennsylvania's definition of intellectual disability under Commonwealth v. Miller was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
2. Whether the appellate court could reject the PCRA court's credibility determinations and reweigh conflicting expert and lay evidence concerning intellectual functioning, adaptive limitations, and age of onset.
3. Whether a petitioner may establish intellectual disability under Miller without a formal childhood diagnosis of mental retardation.

Disposition

reversed