Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Joseph Derhammer

Summary

Justice Wecht concurs in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision reversing Joseph Derhammer’s conviction because the statute underlying the conviction had been declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Nieman, and subsequent legislation did not fill the resulting gap in criminalization. The concurrence criticizes the Superior Court’s effort to revive or reconstruct prior Megan’s Law provisions, emphasizing that resolving such legislative gaps is the General Assembly’s function rather than the judiciary’s.

Holdings

1. Because the statute criminalizing the charged conduct had been invalidated and the General Assembly did not reenact the relevant provision, there was no criminal law in effect under which Derhammer could be convicted.
2. Courts may not fill a gap in criminal legislation by conjecturing which statutory provisions the General Assembly would have preferred to revive or combine; filling such gaps is a legislative function.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Derhammer could be convicted for failing to register a change of address when the applicable Megan's Law III provision had been held unconstitutional and the General Assembly had not reenacted the relevant criminal provision.
2. Whether courts could revive or combine provisions of prior Megan's Law enactments and amendments to fill the legislative gap created by the invalidation of Megan's Law III.

Disposition

reversed