State v. Roger Graham

Summary

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed Roger Graham’s convictions for first-degree murder, discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy, as well as his sentences, including life imprisonment without parole. The court rejected challenges to the jury instructions, including instructions on vicarious liability, aiding and abetting, and reasonable doubt. It also upheld the admission of testimony under the excited-utterance and consciousness-of-guilt theories.

Holdings

1. The law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply because jury instructions used in a trial ending in a mistrial were not binding interlocutory rulings, and the trial justice properly used different instructions at the third trial.
2. The vicarious-liability instructions were proper because a member of a conspiracy may be held criminally responsible for acts committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the unlawful purpose, including murder committed by another conspirator.
3. The trial justice properly instructed the jury that Graham could be convicted as an aider and abettor because the evidence supported an inference that he knowingly and actively assisted Tajendra Patel in the murder.
4. The reasonable-doubt instruction was adequate because the requirement that jurors have a firm belief in the defendant's guilt correctly defined reasonable doubt and did not require the additional word lasting.
5. The trial justice properly admitted the wife's description of the assailant under the excited-utterance exception because she remained under the stress of the startling event when she made the statements.
6. The testimony was admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 because it was relevant to consciousness of guilt and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
7. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Graham conspired with Tajendra Patel to murder Sanjeev Patel, so denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was proper.
8. The murder-for-hire circumstance does not require proof that money actually changed hands before the killing; proof of an agreement to exchange money is sufficient.
9. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate and was affirmed.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial justice violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by using jury instructions different from those used in Graham's two prior mistrials.
2. Whether the jury was properly instructed on vicarious liability arising from conspiracy.
3. Whether the jury was properly instructed that Graham could be convicted as an aider and abettor.
4. Whether the reasonable-doubt instruction requiring a firm belief improperly omitted a requirement of a firm lasting belief.
5. Whether testimony concerning the victim's wife's statements to a police officer was admissible under the excited-utterance exception to hearsay.
6. Whether testimony that Graham solicited the killing of the victim's son was admissible under Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.
7. Whether the evidence was sufficient to deny Graham's motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge.
8. Whether the jury properly considered the murder-for-hire circumstance supporting life without parole.
9. Whether the life-without-parole sentence was appropriate.

Disposition

affirmed