George Karousos et al. v. Jonathan Pardee et al.

Summary

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Jonathan Pardee and the other defendants in an abuse-of-process action arising from a zoning appeal concerning the proposed use of Fairlawn as a culinary school. The Court held that the defendants' petitioning activity was not subjectively baseless and therefore qualified for immunity under Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute. The Court also affirmed the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, while remanding for determination of fees and costs incurred in defending the judgment on appeal.

Holdings

1. Pardee's zoning appeal was not subjectively baseless because the evidence showed that he sought the outcome of the governmental process—to prevent the property's use as a culinary school—rather than attempting to use the governmental process itself for direct effects such as harassment or delay. His petitioning activity therefore qualified for anti-SLAPP immunity.
2. Summary judgment for defendants was proper because Karousos failed to produce evidence of the ulterior or wrongful purpose required for an abuse-of-process claim.
3. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding fees and costs incurred in defendants' unsuccessful initial summary-judgment motion and unsuccessful certiorari petition. The anti-SLAPP statute makes an award mandatory for a prevailing party, but the amount must still be reasonable and is subject to the trial court's discretion.
4. Pardee was entitled under the anti-SLAPP statute to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the judgment on appeal, with the amount to be determined by the Superior Court on remand.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Pardee's petition to the Newport Zoning Board was subjectively baseless under Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute and therefore outside the statute's conditional immunity.
2. Whether the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment on the abuse-of-process claim.
3. Whether the Superior Court properly limited the award of attorneys' fees and costs to reasonable fees and costs associated with the successful assertion of anti-SLAPP immunity.
4. Whether Pardee was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the judgment on appeal.

Disposition

affirmed