Corrine A. Lang as Executrix of the Estate of Kevin Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island

Summary

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court concerning accidental disability retirement benefits for a firefighter diagnosed with colon cancer. The Court held that the Workers’ Compensation Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the retirement board’s decision. It also held that Rhode Island’s occupational-cancer statute does not create a conclusive or rebuttable presumption that every cancer diagnosed in a firefighter is occupational; the firefighter must prove the required causal connection to employment.

Holdings

1. The Workers’ Compensation Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from an adverse Retirement Board decision when the application for accidental disability benefits was filed pursuant to the timing mandate in G.L. 1956 § 45-19-1(j).
2. Occupational cancer is included within the injuries or illnesses for which an aggrieved party may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court under § 45-21.2-9(f).
3. Proceedings filed in the Workers’ Compensation Court under § 45-21.2-9 are subject to the applicable provisions of chapters 29 through 38 of title 28, not merely to case-management and dispute-resolution procedures.
4. Chapter 19.1 of title 45 does not create a conclusive or rebuttable presumption that all cancers diagnosed in firefighters are occupational cancers. A firefighter must prove a causal connection between the cancer and employment-related exposure to smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or chemical substances.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Workers’ Compensation Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-9(f) to hear an appeal from the Retirement Board’s denial of an accidental disability retirement application filed under the timing mandate in § 45-19-1(j).
2. Whether occupational cancer falls within the injury or illness appeal provision of § 45-21.2-9(f).
3. Whether proceedings in the Workers’ Compensation Court under § 45-21.2-9 are governed by the substantive provisions of chapters 29 through 38 of title 28, including the provisions defining occupational disease and the date of disablement.
4. Whether chapter 19.1 of title 45 creates a conclusive or other presumption that all cancers diagnosed in firefighters are occupational cancers arising from their employment.

Disposition

other