Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557

Summary

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed a challenge to South Carolina Code section 16-13-470, which criminalized selling or distributing urine or adulterants with intent to defraud a drug or alcohol screening test. The court held that the statute's language creating a presumption of intent was unconstitutional and severed it, while upholding the remainder of the statute against challenges based on vagueness, free speech, equal protection, punishment, interstate commerce, privacy, and the Fourth Amendment. The court also addressed mootness and affirmed the denial of a temporary injunction.

Holdings

1. The appeal from denial of the temporary injunction was moot because the trial court's subsequent order on the merits superseded the temporary injunction and a decision by the Supreme Court would have no practical legal effect on that injunction.
2. The statutory language providing that intent is presumed when specified drug-test-thwarting devices or instructions accompany a sale unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof and operated as a conclusive presumption. That language was severed from the statute.
3. The remainder of section 16-13-470 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because its terms gave persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the prohibited conduct and its provisions sufficiently defined the conduct criminalized.
4. Section 16-13-470 served the legitimate public purpose of promoting workplace safety and was a valid exercise of South Carolina's police power.
5. The remainder of section 16-13-470 did not violate the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, Eighth Amendment, Commerce Clause, constitutional privacy rights, or Fourth Amendment.
6. The trial court properly considered the merits to the extent necessary to determine whether Curtis had made a prima facie showing and was likely to succeed on his constitutional claims.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the appeal from denial of a temporary injunction became moot after the trial court entered a final order on the merits.
2. Whether section 16-13-470's presumption of intent unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof or acted as a conclusive presumption.
3. Whether the remainder of section 16-13-470 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
4. Whether section 16-13-470 served a legitimate public purpose and constituted a valid exercise of the State's police power.
5. Whether section 16-13-470 violated the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, Eighth Amendment, Commerce Clause, constitutional privacy rights, or Fourth Amendment.
6. Whether the trial court improperly reached the merits when ruling on Curtis's motion for temporary relief.

Disposition

affirmed