McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33

Summary

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed Regina Denise McKnight’s post-conviction relief claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel following her conviction for homicide by child abuse. The court held that counsel was ineffective in preparing the defense, investigating medical evidence, and objecting to a confusing supplemental jury instruction on criminal intent, but rejected claims concerning an alternative-cause-of-death instruction, an involuntary-manslaughter instruction, and an equal-protection challenge.

Holdings

1. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by presenting only an expert whose testimony reinforced the State's theory, failing to obtain available favorable expert testimony, and failing to investigate and rebut the medical research and methodologies relied on by the State's experts.
2. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court responded to the jury's question about criminal intent by repeating a general instruction that referenced negligence without clarifying the specific mental state required for homicide by child abuse.
3. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction that McKnight had no burden to prove an alternative cause of death.
4. Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of homicide by child abuse under South Carolina's elements test, so counsel was not ineffective for failing to request that instruction.
5. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the differing penalties for criminal abortion and homicide by child abuse under the Equal Protection Clause because McKnight was not similarly situated to persons prosecuted under the abortion statute, and the statutory classifications and penalties had reasonable legislative bases.
6. Counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the autopsy report into evidence because the report was important defense evidence that contradicted the State's theory and its omission prejudiced McKnight.
7. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that McKnight did not know cocaine use could harm her unborn child because the omission did not prejudice her.
8. The PCR court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the defense expert's testimony concerning professional standards because the testimony applied the Strickland test to case-specific facts and amounted to a legal argument rather than factual assistance.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare an adequate defense through expert testimony, investigation, and cross-examination.
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly confusing supplemental jury instruction concerning the criminal intent required for homicide by child abuse.
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction that the defense had no burden to prove an alternative cause of death.
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an involuntary-manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense.
5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the disparity between the criminal-abortion and homicide-by-child-abuse statutes under the Equal Protection Clause.
6. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the autopsy report into evidence.
7. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that McKnight lacked knowledge that cocaine use could harm her unborn child.
8. Whether the PCR court properly excluded expert testimony concerning professional standards for South Carolina defense lawyers.

Disposition

reversed