Robert K. and Sharon G. Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Commission, 376 S.C. 165

Summary

The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Robert and Sharon Kurschner's application to subdivide the historic Sarsfield property in Camden. The court held that a planning commission member who had been elected to the state legislature but had not yet taken the oath of office was not required to recuse herself, and that the proceedings satisfied procedural due process. The court further held that the city's historic-preservation regulation did not require a balancing test, that the commission's decision was supported by evidence and was not affected by legal error, and that any takings claim was not ripe.

Holdings

1. The Commission member was not required to recuse herself because she had not yet taken the oath of office, and her participation did not require reversal in any event because the Kurschners could not show substantial prejudice.
2. Procedural due process did not require the Commission to use trial-type procedures, exclude hearsay, permit cross-examination or voir dire, or provide the full range of safeguards requested in deciding the discretionary land-use application.
3. Applying the any-evidence standard to review the Commission's decision did not violate procedural due process and was required by the governing statute and legislative grant of broad planning discretion.
4. The Commission's denial was not controlled by an error of law and was supported by evidence in the record; the applicable historic-site regulation did not require a balancing test.
5. The takings claim was not ripe for review in this direct appeal and had to be litigated in a separate action.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Planning Commission member who had won a special election to the South Carolina House but had not yet taken the oath of office was required to recuse herself and whether her participation invalidated the Commission's decision.
2. Whether the Commission's hearing procedures denied the Kurschners procedural due process by permitting opposing evidence, considering hearsay, denying cross-examination and voir dire, or otherwise failing to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
3. Whether the circuit court's application of the any-evidence standard denied the Kurschners meaningful judicial review.
4. Whether the Commission's decision was unsupported by evidence, controlled by an error of law, or constituted an uncompensated taking.

Disposition

affirmed