Summary
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that Charleston County School District could not exclude a qualified nonresident child from its magnet schools solely because she qualified to attend the district’s public schools through ownership of qualifying real property rather than residence. The court interpreted S.C. Code section 59-63-30 to place qualifying resident children and property-owning children on equal footing, while recognizing the school board’s authority to establish magnet-school admission criteria. The court also addressed exhaustion of administrative remedies and affirmed the circuit court’s declaratory judgment.
Holdings
- Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is generally a matter of prematurity, policy, convenience, and discretion rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Exhaustion was excused because further administrative proceedings would have been futile, inadequate in light of the impending enrollment date, and the case presented important issues of public interest.
- A child who owns real estate in a school district with an assessed value of at least $300 is statutorily entitled to attend that district's public schools on the same eligibility footing as a resident child, assuming the other statutory requirements are met.
- A school board may establish admission requirements and determine which school within its district a student will attend, but it may not use that authority to exclude an entire class of children whom section 59-63-30 recognizes as eligible to attend district schools.
- Payment of tuition alone does not make a nonresident child eligible to enroll in a particular school in another district. Tuition is a secondary charge that may be imposed after the child is otherwise statutorily eligible and admitted to a particular school.
Questions Presented
- Whether the circuit court could exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action despite the absence of a final school-board order and the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
- Whether S.C. Code section 59-63-30 permits a school district to exclude a child from its magnet schools solely because the child qualifies through property ownership rather than residence.
- Whether the school board's authority under section 59-19-90(9) to assign students and establish magnet-school admission criteria permits a physical-residency requirement that excludes statutorily eligible property-owning children.
- Whether payment of tuition alone makes a nonresident child eligible to enroll in a particular school in another district.
- Whether the circuit court improperly lifted the automatic stay pending appeal.
Disposition
affirmed
Cases Cited (14)
- Ward v. State, 343 S.C. 14, 538 S.E.2d 245 (2000)(followed)
- Hyde v. S.C. Department of Mental Health, 314 S.C. 207, 442 S.E.2d 582 (1994)(followed)
- Brown v. James, 389 S.C. 41, 697 S.E.2d 604 (Ct. App. 2010)(followed)
- Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 712 S.E.2d 416 (2011)(followed)
- Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001)(followed)
- Media General Communications, Inc. v. S.C. Department of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 694 S.E.2d 525 (2010)(followed)
- Charleston County School District v. State Budget & Control Board, 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993)(followed)
- Gay v. Ariail, 381 S.C. 341, 673 S.E.2d 418 (2009)(followed)
- Stewart v. Charleston County School District, 386 S.C. 373, 688 S.E.2d 579 (Ct. App. 2009)(distinguished)
- Arnold v. Association of Citadel Men, 337 S.C. 265, 523 S.E.2d 757 (1999)(followed)
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