South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Revels

Summary

The South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether landowners who prevailed in a condemnation action were entitled to attorneys' fees calculated under a contingency-fee agreement or by a lodestar method. The court held that the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, rather than the general state-action statute, governed the fee award, and that a contingency-fee agreement was one factor but not controlling. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for application of the statutory analysis and submission of an itemized fee statement.

Holdings

1. Section 28-2-510 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act governs the award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing landowner in the condemnation action. Layman provides general guidance regarding fee-shifting statutes but is not controlling because it interpreted a different, general statute.
2. A contingency-fee agreement cannot by itself determine the attorneys' fee award under section 28-2-510(B)(1). It is one factor that may explain the basis for the fee charged, but the court must consider the itemized statement, actual time expended, actual expenses, and the circumstances surrounding the litigation in determining reasonable litigation expenses.
3. Section 28-2-510 does not require the court first to determine whether the contingency-fee agreement is reasonable. The court must first determine whether an award is warranted under the statute, then review the required itemized statement and may, but is not required to, conduct a Jackson-factor evaluation.
4. Remand was required because the circuit court did not conduct the proper analysis under section 28-2-510 and counsel had not submitted an itemized statement identifying the fee charged and actual number of hours expended.

Questions Presented

1. Whether section 28-2-510 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, rather than the general state-action attorneys' fee statute considered in Layman, governs the award of attorneys' fees to a landowner prevailing in a condemnation action.
2. Whether a contingency-fee agreement may alone determine the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees recoverable from the condemnor under section 28-2-510(B)(1).
3. Whether section 28-2-510 requires a threshold determination that the contingency-fee agreement is reasonable under Jackson v. Speed.
4. Whether the circuit court conducted the statutory analysis required by section 28-2-510(B)(1) and received the required itemized statement identifying the fee charged and actual time expended.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded