People v. Choyce

Summary

The California Supreme Court considers William Jennings Choyce’s automatic appeal from convictions and death sentences for three first degree murders, along with rape and sexual penetration convictions and related enhancements. The court rejects his claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, finding no substantial evidence of provocation and concluding any error was harmless. The court affirms the judgment in its entirety.

Holdings

1. A trial court need not instruct on voluntary manslaughter when the record contains no substantial evidence of victim-caused provocation or that the defendant subjectively acted in the heat of passion. Speculation does not constitute substantial evidence. Any error would also have been harmless because the jury's felony-murder special-circumstance findings established first degree felony murder, which does not require malice.
2. The trial court did not err by failing to give an additional instruction expressly stating that rape requires a live victim. The claim was forfeited because Choyce did not request an additional or clarifying instruction, and it failed on the merits because there was no substantial evidence or defense argument that the victims were dead when the sexual assaults occurred; the instructions referring to the victim's will and fear necessarily implied a living victim.
3. CALJIC No. 2.90 adequately conveyed the presumption of innocence, the absence of a defendant's obligation to present or refute evidence, the possibility that a conflict or lack of evidence may create reasonable doubt, the prosecution's burden, and the required proof of each element. Additional clarifying instructions were forfeited when not requested.
4. The felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances adequately narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and are not unconstitutional merely because intentional killing is not required in every felony-murder case or because multiple murder encompasses defendants with varying degrees of culpability.
5. Choyce forfeited his prosecutorial-misconduct claim by failing to make timely misconduct objections and request a jury admonition. The claim also failed on the merits because the questioning did not infect the trial with fundamental unfairness or constitute deceptive or reprehensible methods likely to affect the outcome; any assumed misconduct was harmless.
6. The trial court erred by failing to redefine reasonable doubt during the penalty phase after instructing the jury to disregard the guilt-phase instructions, but the error was harmless because nothing indicated that the jury applied an incorrect or inconsistent legal standard.
7. The trial court erred under subsequently controlling precedent by responding to the jury's question with an instruction to assume that the life-without-parole sentence would be carried out, but the error was harmless because the instructions clearly conveyed parole ineligibility and the record contained no substantial suggestion that Choyce would be released.
8. Extended confinement under a judgment of death while the automatic appeal is resolved does not violate the Eighth Amendment or analogous state constitutional provisions.
9. The penalty phase may include victim-impact testimony from multiple family members and from surviving victims of charged or qualifying violent crimes; such evidence need not be limited to witnesses present at the crime scene or to effects known or reasonably apparent to the defendant. The evidence is subject to exclusion if so unduly prejudicial that it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
10. The trial court's imposition of one-third terms for the firearm enhancements attached to the three murder counts was unauthorized because those counts were not subordinate terms. The abstract of judgment must be amended to impose the full four-year term for each enhancement.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion.
2. Whether the trial court was required to instruct that rape requires a live victim and whether the claim was forfeited.
3. Whether CALJIC No. 2.90 adequately instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Whether California's felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances are unconstitutional.
5. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-examination of a defense psychologist.
6. Whether failure to redefine reasonable doubt during the penalty phase was prejudicial.
7. Whether the trial court adequately responded to the jury's question concerning life without parole.
8. Whether the delay between the death sentence and execution violated the federal or state prohibitions on cruel or unusual punishment.
9. Whether the penalty-phase victim-impact evidence was improperly admitted or excessive.
10. Whether California's death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional for failing to impose specified burdens of proof, unanimity requirements, proportionality review, or other asserted safeguards.
11. Whether the trial court imposed unauthorized one-third terms for firearm enhancements attached to non-subordinate murder counts.

Disposition

affirmed