Kristin Allyn Weatherholtz v. Dylan Jacob McKelvey

Summary

Justice Dougherty issued a concurring and dissenting opinion in an appeal concerning the statute of limitations for obtaining a protection order under Pennsylvania's Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act. The opinion disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the limitations period begins when an act or circumstance demonstrates a continued risk of harm, rather than when the underlying sexual violence or intimidation occurred. It also argues that the majority's interpretation undermines the limitations period and raises due process and other constitutional concerns.

Holdings

1. In Justice Dougherty's view, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could first prove both statutory elements, including a continued risk of harm, and the continued-risk element does not require a separate later act or circumstance after the underlying sexual violence or intimidation.
2. In Justice Dougherty's view, allowing accrual to be restarted whenever a plaintiff experiences or invokes increased fear would effectively nullify the six-year statute of limitations recognized in K.N.B.
3. Justice Dougherty stated that the majority's interpretation, combined with K.N.B.'s holding that a plaintiff's fear of encountering the defendant need not be objectively reasonable, raises serious concerns about whether the Act complies with due process.

Questions Presented

1. When does the six-year statute of limitations for an action under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act begin to run: from the date of the underlying act of sexual violence or intimidation, or from the date of the act or circumstance demonstrating a continued risk of harm?
2. Whether, under the facts of the case, Weatherholtz's cause of action accrued before her June 6, 2022 flea-market encounter because her subjective fear and anxiety predated that encounter.
3. Whether the majority's interpretation of the Act raises constitutional due-process concerns by permitting protective orders based on subjective fear and without proof of a new act by the defendant.

Disposition

other