Summary
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the denial of the defendant employer-vessel owner's motion for summary judgment in a personal-injury action arising from two incidents involving a barge and access to shore. The court held that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the first incident because the alleged negligence concerned the defendant's role as employer rather than vessel owner. It also held that the defendant was not liable for the second incident, which occurred on a pier or land rather than on the vessel or its appurtenance, and affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's cross-motion.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provided the plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the January 3, 2018 incident because the alleged negligence arose from the defendant's role as employer rather than vessel owner.
- Whether the defendant could be liable under section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for injuries sustained when the plaintiff crossed from a concrete pile cap, part of a pier under construction, to land.
- Whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability for either incident.
Holdings
- The defendant established that the January 3, 2018 accident arose from its responsibilities as the plaintiff's employer, not from its responsibilities as vessel owner; therefore, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claims based on that incident.
- The defendant was not liable as vessel owner for injuries sustained when the plaintiff fell while crossing from the concrete pile cap, which was part of the pier being constructed, to land.
- The plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on liability for either incident.
Key quotations
“Liability in vessel negligence under section 905(b) will only lie where the dual-capacity defendant breached its duties of care while acting in its capacity as vessel owner.” (at 124-125)
“Piers and docks are deemed extensions of the land” (at 199)
“while the means of access between a dock and a vessel is considered an appurtenance of the vessel” (at 199)
Factual background
James Cannon was employed by H & L Contracting on a project repairing the fender system of the Whitestone Bridge. He operated an excavator positioned on a company-owned barge and allegedly injured himself on January 3, 2018, when he slipped from a bent excavator step into an uncovered hole in a crane mat. On January 11, 2018, while leaving the barge at the end of the project, he disembarked onto a concrete pile cap, walked toward shore, and allegedly fell while crossing a two-to-three-foot gap between the pile cap and the shore.
Procedural history
The plaintiff sued his employer, H & L Contracting, LLC, for injuries allegedly sustained in two incidents connected with a bridge-repair project. The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied both the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed insofar as appealed from, granted the defendant's motion, and affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from.