Summary
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed an order denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability in a rear-end collision personal-injury action. The court held that the defendants' assertion that the plaintiff stopped suddenly, without more, did not provide a nonnegligent explanation sufficient to defeat summary judgment, while any comparative negligence would remain for trial.
Holdings
- A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence by the rear vehicle's operator, requiring that operator to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the collision.
- A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate freedom from comparative fault to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability.
- An assertion that the lead vehicle stopped suddenly, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence arising from a rear-end collision.
- Any comparative negligence by Brindisi remains to be determined at trial and may offset the amount of damages, but it does not defeat summary judgment on defendants' liability.
Questions Presented
- Whether Brindisi established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability based on evidence that defendants' vehicle struck his stopped vehicle from behind.
- Whether defendants raised a triable issue of fact on liability by asserting that Brindisi stopped suddenly.
- Whether any comparative negligence by Brindisi remained for trial despite summary judgment on liability.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (6)
- Martin v. Copado-Esquivel, 226 AD3d 668(followed)
- Thompson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 208 AD3d 815(followed)
- Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 NY3d 312(followed)
- Despinos-Cadet v. Stein, 209 AD3d 978, 980(cited)
- Martinez v. Colonna, 232 AD3d 876, 877(followed)
- Perez v. Persad, 183 AD3d 771, 772(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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