Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al.

Summary

In this dissent, Justice Sharon G. Lee argues that Ernest Falls’s individualized clemency from the Governor of Virginia fully restored his voting rights and made him eligible to vote in Tennessee. She concludes that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202’s requirements concerning restitution, court costs, and child support apply only to persons whose voting rights have not already been restored, and therefore should not have been imposed on Falls. The dissent would hold that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) resolves the issue in Falls’s favor.

Holdings

1. Under the plain and unambiguous text of section 2-19-143(3), a person convicted in another state of an offense that would constitute an infamous crime in Tennessee is eligible to vote in Tennessee once the other state's governor or appropriate authority has restored the person's rights of citizenship, including the right to vote.
2. A person whose voting rights have already been fully restored by out-of-state clemency does not need to seek a second restoration under section 40-29-202 and is not subject to that section's requirements concerning restitution, court costs, and child support.
3. Sections 2-19-143(3) and 40-29-202 should not be read together to impose section 40-29-202's financial requirements on a person whose voting rights were already restored under section 2-19-143(3), because the statutes have distinct purposes and neither is ambiguous.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a person convicted of an infamous crime in another state becomes eligible to vote in Tennessee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) when the other state's governor has fully restored the person's rights of citizenship.
2. Whether a person whose voting rights were already restored by out-of-state clemency must also satisfy the restitution, court-cost, and child-support requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202.
3. Whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-19-143(3) and 40-29-202 should be construed in pari materia.

Disposition

other