Summary
The concurring opinion addresses whether a defendant’s plea of “true” in a probation-revocation proceeding precludes the defendant from raising defenses in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The opinion agrees that collateral estoppel does not apply but concludes that the plea, when knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made as a judicial confession, may be used as evidence against the defendant in the later prosecution.
Holdings
- A defendant's plea of true in a probation-revocation proceeding does not preclude the defendant from raising any defense in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
- In Judge Slaughter's view, a plea of true made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently in a revocation proceeding is a judicial admission or judicial confession that may be used as evidence against the defendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Questions Presented
- Whether a defendant's plea of true in a probation-revocation proceeding precludes the defendant from raising defenses in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
- Whether a defendant's plea of true in a probation-revocation proceeding constitutes a judicial admission or confession that may be used as evidence against the defendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (4)
- Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 507 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d)(followed by analogy)
- Kemmerer v. State, 113 S.W.3d 513, 517-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d)(followed by analogy)
- Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)(followed)
- Taylor v. State, 474 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
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