Summary
The Supreme Court of Texas held that a partnership's petition filed under an assumed name effectively commenced suit on behalf of the legal entity under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28. The Court further held that supplemental pleadings substituting the entity's correct legal name were effective because any pleading defect was waived, and that the challenge based on failure to file an assumed name certificate was waived because it was not properly raised in the trial court. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.
Holdings
- Some evidence supported the trial court's implied finding that Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. used RMA Partners, L.P. as an assumed name when collecting Sibley's notes. The original petition filed under RMA Partners, L.P. was therefore effective to commence suit on behalf of Sixth RMA.
- Although the second supplemental pleadings were procedurally improper because they did not respond to the preceding pleadings as required for supplemental pleadings, they effectively substituted Sixth RMA's correct legal name because the defect was one of pleading form, was not specifically excepted to, and the pleadings remained in the case through judgment.
- Failure to file an assumed name certificate does not render the plaintiff's claim void; it affects the plaintiff's capacity to maintain the action. Because Sibley did not properly raise the capacity objection in the trial court, he waived it.
Questions Presented
- Whether legally sufficient evidence supported the finding that Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. used RMA Partners, L.P. as an assumed name, making the original petition effective to commence suit on behalf of Sixth RMA.
- Whether Sixth RMA's second supplemental pleadings effectively substituted its correct legal name for the assumed name under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28.
- Whether Sixth RMA was barred from prosecuting its claims because it had not filed an assumed name certificate under the Assumed Business or Professional Name Act, and whether that objection was waived.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (21)
- Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22 S.W.3d 825, 828-29 (Tex. 1999)(followed)
- BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)(followed)
- Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990)(followed)
- Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989)(followed)
- Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001)(followed)
- Glenn v. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island Levee District, 114 Tex. 325, 268 S.W. 452, 453 (1925)(followed)
- Lemp v. Armengol, 86 Tex. 690, 26 S.W. 941, 943 (1894)(followed)
- Windom v. Howard, 86 Tex. 560, 26 S.W. 483, 485 (1894)(followed by analogy)
- Moody-Rambin Interests v. Moore, 722 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)(followed in part)
- Intercity Invs. Co. v. Plowman, 542 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1976, no writ)(followed in part)
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