The City of Houston v. Steve Williams, et al.

Summary

The Supreme Court of Texas considers whether governmental immunity is waived under Texas Local Government Code section 271.152 in a suit by former Houston firefighters alleging underpayment of termination benefits. The Court holds that certain City ordinances and collective bargaining or meet-and-confer agreements may constitute qualifying written contracts, while Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, standing alone, does not establish such a contract. The Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. An ordinance or group of ordinances can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a unilateral contract. The Houston ordinances at issue collectively formed a unilateral employment contract because they were written, stated essential terms, provided for services to the City, and were enacted by the City with intent to be bound.
2. Section 271.152 waived the City's immunity from suit for the firefighters' ordinance-based breach-of-contract claims.
3. Chapter 143, standing alone, did not constitute a contract between Houston and the firefighters and therefore was not a contract subject to section 271.152. A statute may be incorporated into a contract, but municipal adoption of Chapter 143 without a sufficient manifestation of contractual intent does not create a stand-alone municipal contract.
4. The firefighters had standing as intended third-party beneficiaries to enforce the meet-and-confer agreements and collective bargaining agreement. They were not required to prove a breach of the union's duty of fair representation because their claims were not hybrid federal labor-law claims, and they were not required to exhaust the CBA's grievance procedures because they were retirees whose claims accrued after retirement and who were outside the procedures' terms.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Houston ordinances collectively constituted a written unilateral employment contract satisfying Local Government Code section 271.151(2), thereby waiving governmental immunity under section 271.152.
2. Whether Local Government Code Chapter 143, as adopted by Houston, independently constituted a contract between the City and the firefighters.
3. Whether the firefighters had standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce the meet-and-confer agreements and collective bargaining agreement.
4. Whether the firefighters were required to establish a breach of the union's duty of fair representation or exhaust grievance procedures before suing under the collective bargaining agreement.
5. Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal based on conflict between courts of appeals.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded