Summary
The Supreme Court of Texas held that a jury’s findings that both parties breached a contract, that Cimco breached first, and that Bartush’s breach was not excused required effect to both parties’ damages claims. The court explained that a nonmaterial prior breach does not excuse subsequent performance, but a later material breach does not retroactively eliminate a claim for damages arising from the earlier breach. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded for consideration of unresolved evidentiary and attorney’s-fee issues.
Holdings
- Yes. Because the jury was instructed that Bartush's failure to comply would be excused if Cimco had previously failed to comply with a material obligation, the jury's finding that Bartush's breach was not excused necessarily implied that Cimco's prior breach was nonmaterial.
- No. The evidence did not conclusively establish materiality, and reasonable jurors could disagree about whether Cimco breached a material obligation.
- No. Bartush remained liable for its subsequent failure to comply, but its claim for damages caused by Cimco's prior breach remained viable. A subsequent material breach may excuse future performance but does not retroactively discharge a damages claim that had already arisen.
- Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals properly effectuated the jury's verdict. The trial court improperly ignored the finding that Bartush's breach was not excused, while the court of appeals improperly ignored the finding that Cimco breached first.
- The issue could not be resolved on the present record and was remanded to the court of appeals. Because the Supreme Court did not decide whether Question 3 was an invalid basis for liability, it could not determine whether Cimco's objection to Question 3 preserved error regarding Question 24.
Questions Presented
- Whether the jury's finding that Bartush's breach was not excused necessarily implied that Cimco's prior breach was nonmaterial.
- Whether Cimco's alleged failure to provide a refrigeration system capable of maintaining thirty-five degrees was a material breach as a matter of law.
- Whether Bartush's subsequent material or unexcused breach barred its claim for damages arising from Cimco's prior breach.
- Whether the courts below properly effectuated the jury's awards to both parties.
- Whether Cimco preserved error regarding the jury's failure to answer the attorney's-fees question.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (11)
- Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004)(followed)
- Hernandez v. Gulf Grp. Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994)(followed)
- Levine v. Steve Scharn Custom Homes, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 637, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)(followed)
- Mays v. Pierce, 203 S.W.3d 564, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)(followed)
- Hudson v. Wakefield, 645 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. 1983)(followed)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)(followed)
- Gilbert v. Fitz, No. 05-16-00218-CV, 2016 WL 7384167, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 2016, no pet.)(followed)
- Harris Cty. Util. Dist. No. 16 v. Harris Cty. Mun. Dist. No. 36, No. 01-10-00042-CV, 2011 WL 3359698, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 2011, no pet.)(followed)
- Allied Capital Partners, LP v. Proceed Tech. Res., Inc., 313 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)(followed)
- Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (Tex. 1984)(followed)
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Cited In (0)
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Court Document
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