Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc. v. District of Columbia

Summary

The District Court for the District of Columbia considers cross-motions for summary judgment on a remaining selective-enforcement claim arising from arrests of anti-abortion protesters who chalked a sidewalk in violation of the District’s anti-defacement ordinance. Plaintiffs allege that the ordinance was selectively enforced against them while not being enforced against racial-justice protesters during the summer of 2020. The court concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown that the proposed comparators were similarly situated in material respects and grants summary judgment to the District.

Holdings

1. A First Amendment selective-enforcement claim requires plaintiffs to show that they were similarly situated in material respects to individuals against whom the law was not enforced and that the enforcement infringed a constitutional right. Generalized allegations of uneven enforcement are insufficient; plaintiffs must identify specific comparators or specific examples of differential treatment.
2. A violation requiring later investigation and enforcement is not ordinarily a material comparator to a contemporaneous arrest made by officers who witnessed the violation.
3. None of the three proposed comparator protests was similarly situated in material respects to plaintiffs’ protest. The differences in crowd size, police-to-protester ratio, time and location, traffic conditions, public-safety risks, crowd-control concerns, police resources, protest context, and prior warnings were sufficient to defeat the comparator requirement.
4. Summary judgment for the District was appropriate because, viewing the evidence in plaintiffs’ favor, no reasonable jury could find that any proposed comparator was similarly situated to plaintiffs’ protest.

Questions Presented

1. Whether plaintiffs established the similarly-situated-comparator element of a First Amendment selective-enforcement claim.
2. Whether any of the three specific racial-justice protests identified by plaintiffs was similarly situated in material respects to plaintiffs’ protest so as to support an inference of discriminatory enforcement.
3. Whether summary judgment should be entered for the District on the remaining selective-enforcement claim.

Disposition

other