Joshua Lee Close, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Angela Marie Prichard; Colton Hancock, Individually v. City of Bellevue Iowa; Dennis Schroeder; Ryan Kloft; Shelby Mutzl

Summary

The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims brought by the family of Angela Marie Prichard against the City of Bellevue, Iowa, and its police officers arising from the failure to protect her from her ex-husband. The court held that the alleged failure to protect did not state a substantive- or procedural-due-process claim, that Iowa's no-contact-order statute did not create a private right of action, and that the additional state-law claims were deficient. The court also affirmed denial of the plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

Holdings

1. The government's failure to protect an individual from private violence does not ordinarily violate substantive due process because substantive due process limits government action rather than guaranteeing safety or security. The complaint alleged omissions, not affirmative government action creating or increasing the danger, so the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
2. Iowa Code section 664A.6 did not create a legitimate claim of entitlement to arrest or enforcement sufficient to support a procedural-due-process claim.
3. Iowa Code section 664A.6 does not create an implied private right of action against officers for failing to enforce a no-contact order.
4. Iowa's Municipal Tort Claims Act did not create or expand a cause of action against the City of Bellevue; it could waive immunity only to the extent another express statute recognized liability, and section 664A.6 did not recognize liability for the alleged omissions.
5. The Iowa Slayer Statute did not support the plaintiffs' claims because it prevents a person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes another's death from receiving property or benefits from the death; it does not create a wrongful-death recovery against officers who allegedly failed to protect the decedent.
6. The alleged failure to investigate or arrest Christopher did not constitute conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state an Iowa intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to amend because post-judgment amendment is governed by stringent Rule 59(e) standards, and the proposed new allegations were previously available, added little substance, and would not have made the claims plausible.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the alleged failure of police officers and the City of Bellevue to protect Angela from private violence stated a substantive-due-process claim.
2. Whether Iowa's no-contact-order enforcement statute created a protected entitlement supporting a procedural-due-process claim.
3. Whether Iowa Code section 664A.6 created a private right of action against law-enforcement officers or the municipality.
4. Whether the Iowa Slayer Statute supported the plaintiffs' claims against the officers.
5. Whether the alleged failure to investigate or arrest Christopher constituted extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
6. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion seeking to amend the complaint.

Disposition

affirmed