Raymond E. Echevarria v. Darrin Jackson, et al.

Summary

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Forest Preserve police officers and the Forest Preserve District in Raymond Echevarria’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law. The court held that probable cause supported the detention, vehicle seizure, and malicious prosecution claims, and that the officer’s insulting comments did not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law.

Holdings

1. Because Echevarria failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 and did not challenge that ruling on appeal, the court treated defendants' properly supported facts as admitted and reviewed the summary-judgment decision on that record.
2. Officer Jackson had probable cause to detain Echevarria because Echevarria substantially matched the reported description, was found where the caller said the suspect would be, the caller appeared to be an eyewitness willing to sign a complaint, the location was known for public indecency, and Echevarria appeared nervous.
3. Because Officer Jackson had probable cause to detain Echevarria, the Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure claim and Illinois malicious-prosecution claim were properly dismissed on summary judgment.
4. The seizure of Echevarria's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used during the commission of a qualified public-indecency violation and was therefore subject to the Forest Preserve District seizure ordinance.
5. The Forest Preserve District could not be liable under Monell because Echevarria failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation in the seizure of his vehicle.
6. Jackson's comments, although unprofessional, crude, and insulting, were not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support an Illinois intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, even considering his knowledge of Echevarria's PTSD.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the officers had probable cause to detain Echevarria for suspected public indecency, defeating his Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure and Illinois malicious-prosecution claims.
2. Whether the officers had probable cause to seize and tow Echevarria's vehicle under the Forest Preserve District ordinance and the Fourth Amendment.
3. Whether the Forest Preserve District could be liable under Monell absent an underlying constitutional violation.
4. Whether the officers' crude and insulting comments, even with knowledge of Echevarria's PTSD, were sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support an Illinois intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
5. Whether the district court properly treated defendants' Local Rule 56.1 facts as admitted after Echevarria failed to respond.

Disposition

affirmed