Matthew R. Walsh v. Rokoko Electronics et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Rokoko Electronics’ motion to dismiss Matthew R. Walsh’s fourteen-count complaint and denied Walsh’s motion to strike, construed in part as a motion to remand. The court held that federal-question and diversity jurisdiction existed. Several claims were dismissed with leave to amend, while others, including the Song-Beverly Act, CLRA, UCL, unconscionable-contract-terms, and fraudulent-concealment claims, were dismissed without leave to amend.

Holdings

1. The notice of removal was not procedurally defective because a court-admitted attorney signed and filed it, while the other counsel did not sign it and later obtained pro hac vice admission.
2. The court had subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint asserted a federal DMCA claim, the state claims arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, and complete diversity also existed.
3. The complaint failed to state plausible claims for relief because several allegations were conclusory, legally unavailable, insufficiently particularized, or unsupported by a cognizable legal theory.
4. Walsh was not a statutory consumer under either the Song-Beverly Act or the CLRA because he purchased the products primarily for commercial video-game development rather than personal, family, or household purposes.
5. California Civil Code section 1670.5 does not create an affirmative cause of action for unconscionability.
6. Claims dismissed for factual insufficiency were dismissed with leave to amend, while claims barred by legal impossibility, lack of statutory standing, or lack of an affirmative cause of action were dismissed without leave to amend.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the notice of removal should be stricken or the action remanded for procedural defects or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Whether the complaint plausibly pleaded fourteen causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6).
3. Whether Walsh qualified as a consumer under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act when he purchased the products for commercial video-game development.
4. Whether Walsh had statutory standing to assert a DMCA claim.
5. Whether California Civil Code section 1670.5 creates an affirmative cause of action for unconscionability.

Disposition

dismissed