William McIntosh v. Felicia Adkins et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois screened William McIntosh’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court dismissed the property-loss theory, but allowed an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Felicia Adkins concerning prescription-tinted glasses and a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim against Dr. Nitin Thapar concerning involuntary psychotropic medication to proceed in the defendants’ individual capacities. The court denied McIntosh’s motion for recruited counsel and directed service of the complaint.

Holdings

1. An inmate's allegation that property was lost or stolen by another inmate, even if the loss resulted from prison employees' negligence or gross negligence, does not state a federal constitutional claim when an adequate state-law remedy is available.
2. At the screening stage, allegations that a prison official was informed through the grievance process that an inmate lacked medically necessary tinted prescription glasses and was suffering migraines were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim.
3. An allegation that prison officials forced the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs was sufficient at screening to state a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim.
4. The motion for recruitment of counsel was denied because the plaintiff failed to show that he had made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or was effectively precluded from doing so.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the alleged loss or theft of the plaintiff's personal property by or involving prison employees stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether the allegations that Adkins knew through the grievance process that the plaintiff lacked medically necessary tinted prescription glasses and suffered migraines stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim.
3. Whether the allegation that Thapar forced the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs stated a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim.
4. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recruitment of counsel at the screening stage.

Disposition

other