Alexa Marra v. Owners Insurance Company, a/k/a Auto-Owners Insurance Company

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado addresses Owners Insurance Company’s motion for partial summary judgment on Alexa Marra’s statutory and common-law bad-faith insurance claims and its motion to exclude or limit expert testimony. The court denies summary judgment because genuine factual disputes exist regarding whether Owners evaluated Marra’s claim reasonably and whether it acted with reckless disregard. The court grants the motion to exclude in part and denies it in part, although the excerpt does not include the detailed analysis of that ruling.

Holdings

1. Owners was not entitled to summary judgment on the statutory bad-faith claim because evidence that it initially denied Marra's UIM claim without evaluating the claim or considering non-economic and permanent-impairment damages created a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the reasonableness of its conduct.
2. Owners was not entitled to summary judgment on the common-law bad-faith claim because evidence that it initially denied the claim without conducting an evaluation could permit a reasonable jury to find that Owners knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of Marra's claim.
3. Hinkle's disclosure did not comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C) because it identified broad categories of testimony without summarizing the supporting facts and opinions, but exclusion was unwarranted because Owners did not establish prejudice or bad faith.
4. Walford's disclosure was deficient under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), but he may offer causation opinions at trial if limited to opinions formed from his diagnostic workup, orthopedic testing, and range-of-motion testing and if Marra makes him available for an additional deposition at her expense; otherwise his testimony is limited to percipient treatment knowledge.
5. Higginbotham may not offer causation opinions at trial because Marra did not establish that those opinions were formed during treatment, making a retained-expert report required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), and the failure to provide one prejudiced Owners.
6. Kezer may testify about whether Owners's conduct complied with insurance-industry standards and may refer to law as part of the basis for an opinion, but he may not testify that Owners violated the law, breached a legal duty, acted unreasonably or in bad faith, or otherwise direct the jury's legal conclusions.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Owners was entitled to partial summary judgment on Marra's statutory bad-faith claim because its denial of UIM benefits had a reasonable basis.
2. Whether Owners was entitled to partial summary judgment on Marra's common-law bad-faith claim because there was no evidence of knowing or reckless disregard of the validity of the claim.
3. Whether Marra's disclosures for non-retained experts Barbara Hinkle and Richard Walford complied with Rule 26(a)(2)(C), and what remedy was appropriate for any violation.
4. Whether Thomas Higginbotham was required to provide a retained-expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) before offering causation opinions.
5. Whether portions of insurance-industry expert John Kezer's opinions were inadmissible because they stated legal conclusions, directed the jury's decision, or were otherwise irrelevant or unhelpful.

Disposition

other