Fritz Emmanuel Lesly Miot, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al.

Summary

The opinion addresses Haitian Temporary Protected Status holders’ renewed motion for a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705 challenging the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation. The court concludes that it has jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims, would suffer irreparable harm, and are favored by the balance of equities and public interest. The court grants the renewed motion for a stay.

Holdings

1. The district court had jurisdiction because plaintiffs challenged the Secretary's decision-making process, statutory compliance, and constitutional conduct rather than asking the court to substitute its own substantive TPS determination.
2. The INA provisions governing judicial review of orders of removal and discretionary individual immigration adjudications did not bar review of the generally applicable TPS termination challenged here.
3. The APA's exception for agency action committed to agency discretion by law did not preclude review.
4. Plaintiffs were substantially likely to establish that the Secretary acted contrary to law and in excess of statutory authority by terminating Haiti's TPS designation without the meaningful consultation required by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
5. Plaintiffs were substantially likely to show that the termination was arbitrary and capricious because the Secretary's conclusion that Haiti was safe for return ran counter to the administrative record and her national-interest analysis failed to focus on Haitian TPS holders or establish a rational connection between the facts and termination.
6. Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for a § 705 stay because they showed a substantial likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and that the merged balance of equities and public interest favored preserving the status quo.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to review claims that the Secretary's TPS termination process violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment.
2. Whether the TPS statute's jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), barred review of challenges to the Secretary's decision-making process rather than the substantive TPS determination itself.
3. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), or 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) barred judicial review.
4. Whether plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed in showing that the Secretary failed to consult appropriate agencies as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
5. Whether plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on their claims that the termination was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and part of an unlawful pattern and practice.
6. Whether plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm and whether the balance of equities and public interest favored a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705.

Disposition

other