Hiligh v. Duncan & Hopkins, P.C.

Hiligh · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · April 28, 2026 · No. 25-cv-3371 (CRC)

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Wilbur Hiligh’s motion to remand an action against several law firms. The court held that the complaint’s RICO claim supplied federal-question jurisdiction and that the related D.C. law claims fell within supplemental jurisdiction. It also concluded that the served defendants had consented to removal, while the allegedly dissolved third defendant had not been properly served and therefore did not need to consent. The court denied the request for entry of default without prejudice and set deadlines for service and responsive pleadings.

Holdings

  1. A complaint that asserts a RICO cause of action presents a federal question and is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the action could have been brought originally in federal court.
  2. The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the District of Columbia law claims because they form part of the same case or controversy as the federal RICO claim.
  3. The rule of unanimity requires timely consent from all defendants who were properly joined and served, but does not require consent from a defendant who had not been properly served when removal occurred.
  4. Service on a defendant's attorney is insufficient unless the attorney was authorized to accept service of process for that defendant.
  5. Entry of default was improper because the defendant had not been shown to have been properly served and, independently, the deadline to answer or otherwise respond had been stayed.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the RICO claim supplied federal-question jurisdiction sufficient to support removal.
  2. Whether the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related District of Columbia law claims.
  3. Whether removal was procedurally defective because all defendants had not independently provided written consent.
  4. Whether McChesney, Duncan & Dale was properly served such that its consent to removal was required.
  5. Whether McChesney, Duncan & Dale was in default while the deadline to respond to the complaint was stayed.

Disposition

other

Cases Cited (26)

  • Longwood Village Restaurant, Ltd. v. Ashcroft, 157 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 n.3 (D.D.C. 2001)(followed)
  • District of Columbia v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2008)(followed)
  • Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 79 F. Supp. 3d 265, 267 (D.D.C. 2015)(followed)
  • Ballard v. District of Columbia, 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011)(followed)
  • Johnson-Brown v. 2200 M St. LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003)(followed)
  • Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(followed)
  • Nichols v. 300 M St. Development Group, 783 F. Supp. 3d 273, 275 (D.D.C. 2025)(followed)
  • District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F.4th 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2023)(followed)
  • American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)(followed)
  • Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)(followed)

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