DePaul v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation

DePaul · United States District Court for the District of Connecticut · March 27, 2026 · No. 3:24-CV-271 (KAD)

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut grants Kimberly-Clark Corporation’s motion to dismiss a putative class action arising from alleged PFAS contamination associated with the company’s New Milford, Connecticut facility and landfill. The court concludes that the plaintiffs’ landfill and smokestack-emissions theories do not plausibly allege that Kimberly-Clark caused the PFAS contamination and resulting injuries. The action asserted claims including negligence, medical monitoring, nuisance, recklessness, strict liability, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Holdings

  1. The Third Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege that Kimberly-Clark's conduct was the actual cause of plaintiffs' alleged injuries because the causation theories depended on multiple unsupported assumptions regarding Kimberly-Clark's use of specific PFAS chemicals, the contents of the paper sludge, the source of the detected PFAS, and the movement of PFAS through the environment.
  2. The landfill theory was too conclusory and speculative to plausibly allege that PFAS in Kimberly-Clark's landfill caused PFAS-related contamination and injuries at plaintiffs' properties.
  3. The smokestack-emissions theory did not plausibly allege that Kimberly-Clark emitted PFAS chemicals from the New Milford Facility or that those emissions caused plaintiffs' contamination and injuries.
  4. The continuous pollution cycle theory did not plausibly allege that Kimberly-Clark's conduct was a substantial factor in plaintiffs' injuries.
  5. Leave to amend was denied because plaintiffs had received ample prior opportunities to plead a viable claim and further amendment appeared futile in light of the court's rejection of each causal theory.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Third Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that Kimberly-Clark's conduct was the actual cause and proximate cause of plaintiffs' alleged PFAS-related injuries.
  2. Whether plaintiffs' landfill, smokestack-emissions, and continuous-pollution-cycle theories plausibly established causation under Rule 12(b)(6).
  3. Whether the court should grant plaintiffs leave to amend after dismissing the Third Amended Complaint.

Disposition

dismissed

Cases Cited (29)

  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(applied)
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 570 (2007)(applied)
  • Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010)(applied)
  • Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687 n. 13 (2004)(applied)
  • Cyrus v. PennyMac Loan Servs., No. 3:24-CV-1145 (VAB), 2025 WL 2834949, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2025)(applied)
  • Dougan v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 337 Conn. 27, 41-42 (2020)(applied)
  • Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 455 Mass. 215, 226 (2009)(applied)
  • Fisk v. Town of Redding, 164 Conn. App. 647, 653 (2016)(applied)
  • Peterson v. iCare Mgmt., LLC, 203 Conn. App. 777, 789 (2021)(applied)
  • Liss v. Milford Partners, Inc., No. X-07CV-044025123-S, 2008 WL 4635981, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008)(applied)

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