McClendon v. Pearson, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut conducts an initial review of pro se inmate Seville McClendon's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against parole officials and correctional staff. The court permits an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Special Parole Officer Pearson to proceed, dismisses all other claims, terminates the remaining defendants, and sets service, discovery, and motion deadlines.

Holdings

1. McClendon's claims concerning the forced signing of the special-parole agreement and the alleged breach of that agreement were dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Any claim challenging incarceration based on the special-parole revocation was dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey because McClendon did not allege that the revocation sentence had been reversed or otherwise invalidated.
2. The allegation that Pearson looked at McClendon with lustful eyes while McClendon was undressed did not state an Eighth Amendment claim because it was an isolated incident of verbal or visual harassment without sufficiently egregious conduct or physical contact.
3. McClendon's allegation that Pearson threw objects into his cell, cutting his leg and causing bleeding, was sufficient at the initial-review stage to state an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim.
4. The alleged failure to provide treatment for the leg cut and later anxiety or panic attack did not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim because the alleged conditions were not sufficiently serious.
5. Official-capacity damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; damages could proceed only against a defendant personally involved in the alleged violation; and the request for an apology and other injunctive relief against Hartford Correctional Center officials was dismissed as unavailable or moot after McClendon's transfer.

Questions Presented

1. Whether McClendon's claims concerning the alleged forced signing and later breach of a special-parole agreement and incarceration for a special-parole violation stated a viable procedural-due-process claim under § 1983.
2. Whether the special-parole-related claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations or by Heck v. Humphrey.
3. Whether Pearson's alleged verbal sexual harassment and leering while McClendon was undressed stated an Eighth Amendment claim.
4. Whether Pearson's alleged throwing of objects into McClendon's cell, causing a bleeding leg injury, stated an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim.
5. Whether the alleged failure to provide medical assistance stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim and whether the requested damages and injunctive relief were available.

Disposition

other