Shawndell Askew v. Yale University and Zackery Barker

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Zackery Barker’s motion to dismiss Count Twelve of Shawndell Askew’s amended complaint. The court held that Askew plausibly alleged a Connecticut common-law defamation claim, including sufficient notice of the alleged statements, actionable statements of fact rather than opinion, and reputational injury. The court also declined to resolve the truth defense at the pleading stage and disregarded Askew’s attempt to assert defamation per se for the first time in opposition to the motion.

Holdings

1. The amended complaint adequately pleaded the content, approximate timing, and recipients of the alleged defamatory communications and therefore provided sufficient notice to survive Rule 12(b)(6). Verbatim quotation of every statement was not required.
2. At the pleading stage, Askew plausibly alleged that statements that she was under investigation and engaged in excessive cell-phone use and smoke breaks were statements of fact capable of defamatory meaning rather than nonactionable opinions.
3. Truth did not warrant dismissal because the alleged truth of the statements was not established on the face of the amended complaint and presented factual questions unsuitable for resolution on a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
4. The court would not consider Askew's attempt to assert or develop a defamation-per-se theory for the first time in opposition to the motion to dismiss because the theory was not pleaded in the amended complaint.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Count Twelve adequately provided notice of the alleged defamatory statements, including their content, timing, and recipients.
2. Whether the alleged statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable statements of fact.
3. Whether the alleged truth of the statements established an affirmative defense apparent on the face of the amended complaint and warranted dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
4. Whether Askew could assert defamation per se for the first time in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Disposition

other