William J. Wallace v. Wesleyan University

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut rules on Wesleyan University’s motion to strike portions of William J. Wallace’s Third Amended Complaint. The court grants the motion as to paragraphs 40 and 44 but denies it as to paragraphs 10–19, 24–25, and specified portions of paragraphs 26, 32, 36, and 38. The surviving claim concerns alleged religious discrimination under Title VII and Connecticut law, and the court orders Wallace to file a Fourth Amended Complaint consistent with the ruling.

Holdings

1. The allegations in paragraphs 10 through 19, paragraphs 24 and 25, the challenged portion of paragraph 26, the challenged portions of paragraphs 32 and 36, and the challenged portions of paragraph 38 were not subject to striking at the pleading stage because Wesleyan had not shown that they had no essential relationship to the claim, that supporting evidence would be inadmissible, or that their inclusion would cause undue prejudice.
2. The court denied the motion to strike most of the challenged allegations even though some referenced Wallace's advocacy for Muslim students or a Muslim chaplain, because Wesleyan had not shown that allowing the allegations to remain would cause undue prejudice; however, the allegations could not be used to establish that Wallace was discriminated against because of his own religion.
3. Paragraphs 40 and 44 were stricken because they directly alleged that Wallace's termination for advocating for Muslim students and a terminated Muslim chaplain constituted religious discrimination, contrary to the court's prior ruling limiting the surviving claim to discrimination based on Wallace's own religion.

Questions Presented

1. Whether allegations concerning campus anti-Catholic events, funding decisions, Wallace's complaints, and related employment events were immaterial or impertinent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
2. Whether allegations that Wallace's termination resulted from his advocacy for Muslim students or a Muslim chaplain should be stricken because they did not support his surviving claim that he was discriminated against because of his own religion.
3. Whether paragraphs 40 and 44, which expressly alleged that Wallace's termination for advocating for Muslim students and a Muslim chaplain constituted religious discrimination, should be stricken.

Disposition

other