David S. Hutchings v. Tony Mattivi

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denies defendant Tony Mattivi’s motion for summary judgment in David S. Hutchings’s action concerning the termination of his employment with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation. The court holds that Kansas law, particularly Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-711(c), provided Hutchings with a right to return to KBI employment after serving as associate director, thereby creating a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court applies the Kansas Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bruce v. Kelly and rejects arguments distinguishing the KBI statute from the comparable Kansas Highway Patrol statute.

Holdings

1. Section 75-711(c) provides a KBI associate director who was previously a KBI member with a right to return to KBI employment when the associate-director appointment ends, including when the employment is terminated. That statutory right creates a constitutionally protected property interest sufficient to support plaintiff's due process and related claims.
2. The statutory use of expiration does not exclude termination. In this statutory context, expiration can encompass termination, so termination of a KBI associate director triggers the right-to-return protection.
3. The differences between the statutes do not materially distinguish Bruce. The fact that the KHP provision historically applied to both classified and unclassified employees, and that the KBI provision describes the return position more generally, does not defeat the conclusion that the KBI provision creates a right to return to employment.
4. Section 75-711(c), interpreted in light of Bruce, contemplates a continuing employment relationship and suggests that an eligible employee must revert to the position and classification status held before appointment as associate director, subject to the statute's compensation and temporary-position provisions.
5. The court would not consider defendant's arguments that plaintiff could not prove intentional misconduct or reasonable certainty of continued employment because defendant raised them for the first time in his reply brief.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-711(c) gives a KBI associate director who was previously a KBI employee a right to return to KBI employment when the associate-director appointment ends through termination.
2. Whether the Kansas Supreme Court's interpretation of the analogous Kansas Highway Patrol right-to-return statute in Bruce v. Kelly applies to the KBI statute despite differences in statutory terminology, employee classification, and the specificity of the position to which the employee must return.
3. Whether the KBI statute requires return to the employee's prior position and classification status, rather than merely to some position with comparable compensation.
4. Whether defendant's new arguments concerning the elements of plaintiff's tortious-interference claim, raised for the first time in reply, should be considered on summary judgment.

Disposition

other