Bryce Bourdieu and Julie Renee Farr v. Shae Cox and SLC Racing, LLC

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico addresses Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a case arising from severe injuries sustained when a racehorse toppled Plaintiff Bryce Bourdieu at a Texas ranch. The court applies the Texas Farm Animal Activity Act and holds that genuine disputes of material fact remain concerning the statutory exceptions for failure to assess the participant’s ability and willful or wanton disregard for safety. The court also denies summary judgment on the alleged oral breach-of-contract claim involving liability insurance.

Holdings

1. Summary judgment was appropriate on plaintiffs' gross-negligence theories to the extent they relied on the first, third, fifth, or sixth exceptions because the parties agreed those exceptions did not apply.
2. Summary judgment was denied because genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether defendants provided the horse and failed to make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine Bourdieu's ability to engage safely in the activity and manage the horse.
3. Summary judgment was denied because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether defendants acted with willful or wanton disregard for Bourdieu's safety by directing or permitting him to ride a racehorse that was not on the approved list of horses he could ride.
4. Summary judgment was denied on plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim because defendants' cited deposition testimony did not establish beyond dispute that no binding oral contract existed between Farr and Cox.
5. Summary judgment was granted for defendants on the negligent-operation claim because the parties agreed that defendants had never conducted official racehorse workouts at the property and that the property was not regulated by the Texas Racing Commission.
6. Summary judgment was denied on the fraud claim because defendants did not argue that the claim should be dismissed.

Questions Presented

1. Whether summary judgment was warranted on plaintiffs' gross-negligence claims under the Texas Farm Animal Activity Act's immunity provisions and exceptions.
2. Whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether defendants failed to make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine Bourdieu's ability to participate safely and manage the racehorse under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 87.004(2).
3. Whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether defendants acted with willful or wanton disregard for Bourdieu's safety under section 87.004(4).
4. Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim based on the asserted absence of a contract with Julie Farr.
5. Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligent-operation-of-a-training-facility claim based on the undisputed facts concerning the facility's operations and Texas Racing Commission regulation.
6. Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' fraud claim when defendants did not move for summary judgment on that claim.

Disposition

other