John Lionel Constance, Jr., individually and as father and next friend of L.G.C. v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, Edward Moore, John Does 1-25

Summary

The document is a Report and Recommendation from a United States magistrate judge addressing the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction concerning custody of a minor child. The magistrate judge recommends denial because the plaintiff cannot proceed pro se on the child’s behalf, failed to establish likely success or irreparable harm, and the claims are subject to immunity, lack of personal involvement, Younger abstention, and potentially Rooker-Feldman.

Holdings

1. The motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should be denied because plaintiff failed to clearly show that he was likely to succeed on the merits and failed to establish likely irreparable harm.
2. A non-attorney parent proceeding pro se may not litigate the federal claims of the parent's minor child, including the child's ADA claims.
3. Plaintiff failed to show likely success on his personal § 1983 claims because he did not allege personal wrongdoing by the individual defendants and the South Carolina Department of Social Services was not a suable person under § 1983 and was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
4. Younger abstention applied, or appeared to apply, because the challenged state family-court proceedings were ongoing, implicated important state domestic-relations interests, and provided an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.
5. If the South Carolina family-court proceedings had ended, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar the federal court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims because he was challenging injuries allegedly caused by prior state-court custody orders and sought their invalidation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether plaintiff established the requirements for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
2. Whether plaintiff could pursue claims on behalf of his minor child while proceeding pro se.
3. Whether plaintiff was likely to succeed on his personal § 1983 claims against the South Carolina Department of Social Services and the individual defendants.
4. Whether Younger abstention barred federal interference with ongoing South Carolina family-court proceedings.
5. Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction if the state family-court proceedings had ended.

Disposition

other