Burlington Industries, Inc., by and through its duly-appointed Receiver, Peter M. McCoy, Jr. v. Continental Casualty Company; Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, f/k/a Aetna Casualty and Surety Company; American Home Assurance Company; Allstate Insurance Company, as successor-in-interest to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company, f/k/a Northbrook Insurance Company; Granite State Insurance Company; American International Group Inc.; AIU Insurance Company; The Continental Insurance Company, as successor-in-interest to Harbor Insurance Company; Westport Insurance Corporation, as successor-in-interest to Puritan Insurance Company; Federal Insurance Company; Munich Reinsurance America Inc., f/k/a American Reinsurance Company; Old Republic Insurance Company; Pacific Employers Insurance Company; Lexington Insurance Company; Scottsdale Insurance Company; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh PA; Century Indemnity Company, as successor-in-interest to Cigna Specialty Insurance Company, f/k/a California Union Insurance Company; Zurich Reinsurance Company LTD, f/k/a Zurich International LTD; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted Burlington Industries, Inc.’s motion to remand under the Barton doctrine. The court held that the doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over claims brought by a state-court-appointed receiver without leave of the appointing court, and that the receiver’s actions fell within the scope of his appointment. The action was remanded to the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas, and the remaining motions were deemed moot with leave to refile in state court.

Holdings

1. The Barton doctrine applied and deprived the federal court of jurisdiction because the action involved claims by or against a court-appointed receiver without prior leave from the appointing court.
2. Allegations that the receiver acted wrongfully, intentionally, illegally, or outside the asserted scope of authority did not defeat application of the Barton doctrine when the challenged conduct was connected to the receiver's official duties.
3. The receiver's filing of a subsequent action in a different South Carolina county did not defeat application of the Barton doctrine.
4. The Barton doctrine was not inapplicable merely because the action was in personam.
5. The receiver was not entitled to costs and attorney's fees because the removal was not objectively unreasonable.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Barton doctrine deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the action because the claims involved a court-appointed receiver.
2. Whether allegations that the receiver acted outside the scope of his authority or violated South Carolina receivership statutes prevented application of the Barton doctrine.
3. Whether the Barton doctrine was inapplicable because the receiver filed a related action in a different South Carolina county or because the claims were in personam.
4. Whether the receiver was entitled to costs and attorney's fees associated with remand.

Disposition

remanded