Lisa Brun and Daniel Brun v. PeakCM Lake Street Hotel, LLP, City of St. Albans, Integrated Technical Systems, Inc., Cross Consulting Engineers, P.C., and Conner Communications, Inc.

Brun · United States District Court for the District of Vermont · June 15, 2026 · No. 2:24-cv-00846

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Vermont grants Hampton Inn’s motion in limine to exclude expert George W. Melchior’s opinion concerning any duty Hampton Inn owed to plaintiffs to warn them not to park in a garage. The court concludes that the opinion is not a reliable application of Melchior’s expertise to the facts, would not assist the jury, and improperly addresses the court’s role in determining whether a legal duty exists.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Vermont
Jurisdiction
United States District Court for the District of Vermont
Decision date
June 15, 2026
Docket number
2:24-cv-00846
Procedural posture
Defendant PeakCM Lake Street Hotel, LLP moved in limine to exclude Plaintiffs' expert testimony concerning any duty Hampton Inn had to warn Plaintiffs not to park in the parking garage.
Standard of review
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district court acts as a gatekeeper and assesses whether expert testimony is relevant, rests on a reliable foundation, and will assist the trier of fact. The proponent bears the burden of establishing admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
Precedential value
Unknown; federal district court order designated in the supplied metadata as an unidentified trial-court opinion.
Parties
Lisa Brun, Daniel Brun v. PeakCM Lake Street Hotel, LLP, City of St. Albans, Integrated Technical Systems, Inc., Cross Consulting Engineers, P.C., Conner Communications, Inc.
Disposition
other

Topics

expert testimonydaubert standardmotion in liminenegligenceduty of care

Practice areas

evidencetortscivil procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the expert's opinion concerning Hampton Inn's alleged duty to warn Plaintiffs was based on a reliable application of principles and methods to the facts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
  2. Whether the expert's opinion fit his expertise and would assist the jury, rather than address lay matters or usurp the court's role in determining whether a legal duty exists.
  3. Whether an expert may offer a conditional opinion based on assumed facts without improperly weighing witness credibility.

Holdings

  1. The expert's opinion was inadmissible because it was not a reliable application of his operational-risk-management principles and methods to the facts of the case.
  2. The opinion was not helpful to the jury because jurors could determine whether it was reasonable for Hampton Inn to direct Plaintiffs to the garage if Hampton Inn knew of the motorcycle prohibition or danger, and the court—not an expert—determines whether a legal duty exists.
  3. A conditional expert opinion based on assumed facts is not inadmissible merely because it depends on the jury's resolution of conflicting testimony, so long as the expert assumes rather than weighs witness credibility.

Key quotations

Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591)
Because the jury can determine for itself whether it was reasonable for Hampton Inn to direct Plaintiffs to the garage if it knew the garage prohibited or posed a danger to motorcyclists, and because it is the court’s responsibility to decide whether a duty exists, Mr. Melchior’s opinion regarding Hampton Inn’s duty is not helpful to the jury, usurps the role of the court, and is therefore inadmissible.

Factual background

Lisa Brun was injured when an access gate at a parking garage owned and operated by the City of St. Albans unexpectedly closed on her. Plaintiffs' expert, George W. Melchior, a licensed architect and professional engineer with experience in parking facilities and operational risk management, inspected the garage, reviewed evidence, and prepared opinions primarily concerning the City's operation of the facility. He also offered a conditional opinion that, if Hampton Inn knew of the garage's motorcycle prohibition or danger to motorcyclists, it should have directed the Bruns not to park there.

Procedural history

Plaintiffs brought a negligence action arising from injuries Lisa Brun sustained when an access gate at a City of St. Albans parking garage unexpectedly closed on her. Hampton Inn moved to exclude the opinion of Plaintiffs' expert, George W. Melchior, regarding Hampton Inn's alleged duty to warn Plaintiffs about the garage's motorcycle prohibition or hazardous gate condition. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the court took it under advisement before granting the motion.

Court Document

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