Summary
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas partially grants and partially denies defendants’ motions to dismiss consolidated claims arising from alleged childhood sexual abuse at Lord’s Ranch. The Court rejects arguments that the Arkansas Revival Act repealed the Delayed Discovery Act by implication or that the delayed-discovery provision is unconstitutionally vague, and holds that only specified plaintiffs plausibly pleaded delayed discovery. Claims by the group-one plaintiffs and John Doe 106 proceed, while the remaining plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed with prejudice as time barred; the Court also addresses voluntary dismissals, jurisdiction, sealing, and targeted discovery concerning entity relationships.
Holdings
- The Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sexual Abuse Act did not impliedly repeal the Delayed Discovery Act because the two statutes can be harmonized, do not irreconcilably conflict, and the Revival Act did not occupy the entire field.
- The Delayed Discovery Act's time-of-discovery provision is not unconstitutionally vague.
- The Delayed Discovery Act applies to claims against both alleged perpetrators and non-perpetrator defendants when the claims are based on sexual abuse.
- Only the group-one plaintiffs and John Doe 106 plausibly pleaded delayed discovery and may proceed; the remaining plaintiffs' claims were dismissed with prejudice as time-barred, subject to the specific voluntary dismissal and stipulation rulings.
Questions Presented
- Whether the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sexual Abuse Act impliedly repealed Arkansas's Delayed Discovery Act.
- Whether the Delayed Discovery Act's time-of-discovery provision is unconstitutionally vague.
- Whether the Delayed Discovery Act applies only to perpetrators or also to non-perpetrator defendants whose alleged liability is based on sexual abuse.
- Whether the plaintiffs plausibly pleaded delayed discovery of the effects or conditions attributable to their alleged childhood sexual abuse.
- Whether the court should dismiss particular claims or plaintiffs without prejudice based on stipulations or voluntary dismissal.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (20)
- Miller v. Subiaco Academy, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Ark. 2005)(cited)
- Kolbek v. Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle Church, Inc., 2013 WL 6816174 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 24, 2013)(applied)
- Highland Industrial Park, Inc. v. BEI Defense Systems Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004)(cited)
- State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 347 Ark. 618, 66 S.W.3d 613 (2002)(cited)
- In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litigation, 860 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc)(applied)
- Geivett v. AMC Management, LLC, 158 F.4th 900 (8th Cir. 2025) (per curiam)(applied)
- Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2004)(distinguished)
- Doe v. Baum, 348 Ark. 259, 72 S.W.3d 476 (2002)(applied)
- Neeve v. City of Caddo Valley, 351 Ark. 235, 91 S.W.3d 71 (2002)(applied)
- Neely v. State, 2010 Ark. 452, 370 S.W.3d 820(applied)
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