Dennis C. Payne, et al. v. General Electric Company, et al.

Summary

This is an order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California addressing cross-motions for summary adjudication and summary judgment in an asbestos-exposure and mesothelioma action involving a General Electric turbine aboard the Golden Bear II. Applying maritime law, the court denied General Electric’s motion on causation, failure to warn, and duty-to-warn issues after finding triable factual disputes, while also ruling on evidentiary objections.

Holdings

1. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Payne was exposed to asbestos insulation related to General Electric's turbine and that the exposure may have been a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma. Summary judgment on causation was therefore denied.
2. Whether General Electric could have provided a warning that might have prevented Payne's injury presented a genuine dispute of material fact for the jury; summary judgment on this ground was denied.
3. Triable issues existed as to all three elements of General Electric's maritime duty to warn under DeVries: whether the turbine required incorporation of asbestos-containing parts, whether General Electric knew or had reason to know the integrated turbine was dangerous for its intended uses, and whether it had reason to believe users would realize the danger. Summary judgment on the duty-to-warn issue was denied.
4. General Electric was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' loss-of-consortium claim because Plaintiffs did not show a clear historical basis for such damages under general maritime law.
5. Punitive damages were available for Plaintiffs' general maritime negligence claim, and General Electric was not entitled to summary judgment on that issue.
6. Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary adjudication against Defendants' government-contractor defense because genuine disputes of material fact existed as to each Boyle prong.
7. Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary adjudication against Redco's sophisticated-user defense because evidence created a triable issue as to whether Payne knew or reasonably should have known of asbestos hazards. Plaintiffs' motion concerning General Electric's withdrawn defense was moot.
8. Plaintiffs were entitled to summary adjudication against Redco's sophisticated-purchaser defense. Even assuming the defense could apply under maritime law, Redco presented no evidence that it warned the intermediaries, determined their knowledge, or reasonably concluded that they would warn Payne.
9. Plaintiffs were entitled to summary adjudication against Defendants' superseding-cause defense because Defendants produced no evidence that the California Maritime Academy's or another entity's failure to warn caused a harm different in kind or was extraordinary and unforeseeable.
10. General Electric's objection to Arnold Moore's report was overruled because Plaintiffs cured the report's initially unsworn status with a signed declaration and the alleged contradictions with deposition testimony did not establish unreliability.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that Payne was exposed to an asbestos-containing product related to General Electric's turbine and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
2. Whether Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a causal connection between General Electric's alleged failure to warn and Payne's injury.
3. Whether triable issues existed under Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries concerning General Electric's maritime duty to warn about asbestos-containing parts incorporated into or used with its turbine.
4. Whether maritime law barred Plaintiffs' claims for loss-of-consortium and punitive damages.
5. Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to summary adjudication against Defendants' government-contractor affirmative defense.
6. Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to summary adjudication against Redco's sophisticated-user and sophisticated-purchaser defenses.
7. Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to summary adjudication against Defendants' superseding-cause defense.
8. Whether Plaintiffs' belatedly signed declaration cured the evidentiary defect in an initially unsworn expert report and whether the report was sufficiently reliable.

Disposition

other