Jerry Grant Frye v. Warden, San Quentin Prison

Summary

This is an order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in Jerry Grant Frye's federal habeas corpus proceeding. The court reviews the effect of Cullen v. Pinholster and later AEDPA precedent on previously granted requests for evidentiary hearings, adopts the magistrate judge's amended findings and recommendations in part, and addresses Frye's claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, juror conduct, and other constitutional issues.

Holdings

1. When reviewing a state-court merits decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2), the district court's review is limited to the evidentiary record that was before the California Supreme Court.
2. The court properly reconsidered its 2006 order granting evidentiary hearings because intervening controlling law changed the permissible scope of review and the applicable reasonableness standard.
3. A federal habeas petitioner challenging a California Supreme Court summary denial must satisfy § 2254(d) by showing that the state decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state-court evidence.
4. Frye was not entitled to habeas relief or an evidentiary hearing on his penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claims because the state court's denial was not unreasonable under the doubly deferential standards of § 2254 and Strickland.
5. Frye was not entitled to relief on his claim that California's death-penalty scheme permits arbitrary and capricious sentencing because Ninth Circuit precedent had upheld the scheme against a facial constitutional challenge.
6. A juror's consultation with a minister about the death penalty during the interval between the guilt and penalty phases was at least possibly prejudicial third-party contact, triggering a presumption of prejudice under the Mattox/Remmer framework. California failed to show there was no reasonable possibility that the communication influenced the verdict, so Frye was entitled to habeas relief on claim 42.
7. Frye was not entitled to habeas relief on claim 44 because the Ninth Circuit held that relief was unavailable under either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

Questions Presented

1. Whether federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) is limited to the evidentiary record before the California Supreme Court.
2. Whether the district court should reconsider its 2006 orders granting evidentiary hearings in light of Cullen v. Pinholster and Harrington v. Richter.
3. Whether Frye was entitled to an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief on his ineffective-assistance, prosecutorial-misconduct, right-to-counsel, mitigation, and capital-sentencing-scheme claims.
4. Whether juror Fairfield's consultation with her minister about the death penalty was third-party contact that was possibly prejudicial under the Mattox/Remmer framework.
5. Whether Frye was entitled to relief on the shackling claim after the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's prior grant of habeas relief.

Disposition

other